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INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS AND 
DISCUSSIONS. 
ToPIC I. 
It was voted at the conference at The Hague In 1899 
that 
''The conference expresses the 'vish that the propos~], 
\vhich conternplate~ the declaration of the inviolability of 
private property in naval warfare, may be :~;eferred to a 
subsequent conference for consideration." 
In view of the above, 'vhat regulations should be rnade 
in regard to private property at sea in time of war~ 
CONCLUSION. 
The following regulations should be made in regard to 
· private property at sea in tin1e of 'var: 
Innocent neutral goods and ships are not liable to cap-
ture. 
Innocent enemy goods and ships, except vessels pro-
pelled by machinery and capable of keeping the high seas, 
are not liable to capture. 
DISCUSSION AND NOTES. 
Attitude of the United States.-Franklin very early 
expressed a general principle for \Vhich the United States 
has stood. He said, in a letter to Nlessrs. D. \Vendorp 
and Thomas Hope Heyhger: 
PAssY, 8 June, 1781. 
There are three employtnents which I 'vish the law of nations 
would protect, so that they should never be Inolested or interrupted 
by enen1ies even in time of war. I 1nean far1ners, fishermen, and 
merchants, because their employ1nents are not only innocent, but are 
for common subsistence and benefit of the human species in general. 
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A~ men grow 1nore l'nlightcned, we may hope this will in time be the 
ca!3e. Till then we must submit, as well as we can, to the e\'ils we 
can not remedy. 
Franklin in 1783 sent an article to Richard Osw·ald, of 
w·hich he ~aid: •~ I rather "·i:::;h than expect that it 'vill be 
adopted.'~ 
ARTICLE. 
If war should hereafter arise between Great Britain and the United 
States, whieh God forbid, the merchants of either country then residing 
in the other :-hall be allowed to remain nine 1nonths to collect their 
debt~ mHl settle tlwir affair~, and may depa.rt freely, carrying off all 
their effects without Inolestation or hindrance. And all fishennen, 
all eulth·ators of the earth, and all arti~ans or n1anufactnrers unarmed, 
and inhabiting unfortified town~. Yillnge~, or places, who labor for 
the common sub~i!3tence and benefit of mankind and peaceably follow 
their respectiYe employments, shall be allowed to continue the same, 
and shall not be mole~tf•u hy the anned force of the enemy in who~e 
power by the e\·ents of the war they 1nay happen to fall; but if any-
thing i:-: neee:-:sary to be taken from them, for the use of such armed 
foree, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price. And all mer-
chants or traders with their unarmed Ye~sels employed in commerce, 
exchanging the pro(luct~ of different place~, and thereby rendering 
the neces~aries, convenience~, and comfort~ of human life more easy 
to obtain and m ore generai, ~hall be allowed to pass freely, unmo-
lested. And neither of the power~ partie~ to this treaty shall grant 
or issue any cmnmis~ion to any priYate armed Yessel~ empowering 
them to take or de:::troy such trading ships or interrupt such com-
merce. (Sparks, The "T orks of Franklin, IX, p. 469.) 
The first part of this propo8ecl article is no"~ generally 
recognized a:::; binding throughout the "·oriel. State~ have 
been 1nore reluctant to adopt the principles in regard 
to '· n1crchant:::; or traders 'Yith their unarn1ed Yes::;els. '' 
The proposition in regard to pri \Tateering has becon1e a 
generally recognized principle. 
The r·nited States has unifonnly endeaYored to obtain 
the broade~t freedon1 for connnerce in tin1e of war. 
Exemption fro1n capture has been extended to the fol-
lo"·ing· ''hen innocently etnploycd: To 
(1) Ycssels engaged in scientific "·ork and in exploration; 
(2) coast-fishing yes~eb innocently en1ployed; 
(3) cartel ships acting "·ithin their per1nitted sphere; 
(4) hospital and other Red Cross ves:::;el:::;. 
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The treaty between the United States and Prussia of 
1785, in Article XXIII, provided that-
all merchant and trading vessels employed in exchanging the products 
of different places, and thereby rendering the necessaries, conven-
iences, and cmnforts of human life n1ore easy to be obtained and n1ore 
general, shall be allowed to pass free and unmolested; and neither of 
the contracting po\vers shall grant or issue any comn1ission to any pri-
vate armed vessels, empowering thmn to take or destroy such trading 
vessels or interrupt such conunerce. (Treaties and Conventions, 
1776-1887' pp. 905-906.) 
This provision did not, however, reappear in the treaty 
of 1799, which took the place of the treaty of 1785, \vhich 
had expired in 1786 by li1nitation. 
It is evident that :F'rnnklin's position \Vas the ideal for 
\Vhich the United States was striYing. It was fully rec-
ognized that it was yet to be attained. 
In a long letter to the n1inister of foreign af:l'airs of the 
French Republic, of ffanuary 27, 1798, signed by Charles 
C. Pinckney, ,J. Marshall, and E. Gerry, occurs the fol-
lowing well-cousidered state1nent in regard to the relations 
of ships and g·oods: 
This principle is to be searched for in the law of nations. That law 
forn1s, independent of cornpact, a rule of action by which the sover-
eignties of the civilized worlu consent to be governed. It prescribes 
what one nation rnay do without giving just cause of war, and what, 
of consequence, another rnay and ought to permit \Vithout being con-
sidered as having sacrificed its honor, its dignity, or its independence. 
'Vhat, then, is the doctrine of the la\v of nations on this subject? 
Do neutral bottmns of right, and independent of particular compact, 
protect hostile goods? The question is to be considered on its n1ere 
right, uninfluenced by the wishes or the interests of a neutral or 
belligerent power. 
It is a general rule that war gives to a belligerent power a right to 
seize and confiscate the goods of his enemy. However humanity may 
deplore the application of this principle there is perhaps no one to 
which man has rnore universally assented, or to which jurists have 
n1ore uniformly agreed. Its theory and its practice have unhappily 
been maintained in all ages. This right, then, may be exercised on 
the goods of an enen1y wherever found unless opposed by some 
superior right. It yields by cmnrnon consent to the superior right of 
a neutral nation to protect, by virtue of its sovereignty, the goods of 
either of the beiligerent powers found within its jurisdiction. But 
can this right of protection, adrnitted to be possessed by every govern-
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ment within its mere litnits in virtue of its absolute ~ov~reignty, he 
conununicated to a vessel navigating the high seas? 
It is supposed that it can not be so communicated, uecause the ocean 
being common to all nations no absolute sovereignty can be acquired 
in it. The rights of all are equal, and 1nust necessarily check, limit, 
and restrain eaeh other. The superior right, therefore, of absolute 
sovereignty to protect all property within its own territory eeases to be 
superior when the property is no longer within its own territory, arHl 
1nay be eneountered by the opposing acknowledged right of a belliger-
ent power to seize and confiscate the goods of hi~ enemy. If the 
belligerent pennits the neutral to attempt, without hazard to himself, 
thus to serve and aid his enemy, yet he doetl not relinquish the right 
of defeating that atten1pt whenever it shall be in his power to defeat 
it. Thus it is admitted that an anned vessel may stop and search at 
sea a neutral bottom, and 1nay take out goods which are contraband of 
war, without gidng cause of offense or being supposed in any degree 
to infringe neutral rights. But this practice could not be permitted 
within the rivers, harbors, or other places of a neutral where its sov-
ereignty was complete. It follows, then, that the full right of afford-
ing protection to all property whatever within its own territory, which 
is inherent in every governtnent, i::; not transferred to a vessel navi-
gating the high seas. The right of a belligerent over the goods of his 
enemy within his reach is as cornplete as his right over contraband of 
war; and it seems a position not easily to be refuted that a situation that 
will not protect the one will not protect the other. A neutral bottom, 
then, does not, of right, in cases where no compact exists, protect 
from his enetny the goods of a belligerent power. (Yol. II, American 
State Papers, Foreign Relations, p. 171.) 
The Atnerican cnyoys al~o affinn that-
The desire of establishing universally the principle that neutral bot-
torus shall n1ake neutral goods is, perhaps, felt by no nation on earth 
lllore strongly than by the r nited States. Perhaps no nation is Inore 
deeply interested in its establishment. It is an object they keep in 
view, and which, if not forceJ. by violence to abandon it, they will 
pursue in such 1nanner as their own judgment n1ay dietate as being 
best calculated to attain it; but the wish to establish a principle is 
essentially different fron1 a determination that it is already established. 
The interests of the G nited States could not fail to produce the wish; 
their duty forbid them to indulge it when deciding on a mere right. 
However solicitous Atneriea migltt be to pursue· all proper means, 
tending to obtain for this principle the assent of all or any of the mari-
time powers of Europe, she never conceived the idea of obtaining that 
consent by force. (Ibid., p. 172.) 
President ~1onroe's tnessagc of Dccetnber 2, 1823, com-
menting on the position taken hy F'rance in the recent 'var 
with Spain, :.;tatcs that instructions ha,~e been gi\'·en to the 
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United State.s n1inisters abroad to n1ake proposals to their 
respective governments \vhich should look to ~'the aboli-
tion of private \Yar on the sea.,. The sarne attitude was 
also maintained in the n1essage of Decernber 7, 1824. No 
international agreernent was reached, ho"~ever. 
In the rnessage of Deceruber ±, 185±, President Pierce, 
after con~iderable discussion of the rights of property at 
sea, says: 
Should the leading powers of Europe concur in proposing as a rule 
of international law to exempt priYate property on the ocean from 
seizure by public anned cruisers as well as by priYateers, the "Gnited 
States will readily 1neet then1 upon that broad ground. 
The treaty of the United States with Russia, negotiated 
by Secretary \V. L. ::\Iarcy in 185± and still in force, in 
Article I provides: 
The two High Contracting Parties recognise as permanent and 
immutable the following principles, to wit: 
1st. That free ships make free goods, that is to say, that the effects 
or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a Power or State at war 
are free frmn capture and confiscation '"hen found on board of neutral 
yessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war. 
2d. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not 
subject to confiscation unless the same be contraband of war. They 
engage to apply these principles to the cmnn1erce an<l naYigation of 
all such Powers and States as shall consent to adopt then1 on their 
part as permanent and immutable. 
To the proposition that the United States accede to the 
Declaration of Paris in 1856, Pre~ident Pierce, in his rnes-
sage of Deceruber 2, 1856, states that the Government is 
desirous to secure "the i1nn1unity of priv·ate property on 
the ocean frorn hostile capture. To effect this object, it 
is proposed to add to the declaration that 'privateering i~ 
and re1nains abolished' the follo·wing arnendment: 
and that the private property of subjeets and citizens of a belligerent 
on the high seas shall be exempt frmn seizure by public armed Yessels 
of the other belligerent except it be contraband." 
This proposition ·was at that time favorably reeeh·ed by 
several States. Italy, Prussia, and Russia "·ere prepared 
to accede to the wish of the United State~. Son1e._ of the 
leaders in France were similarly inclined. Great Britain 
\Vas~ however, unwilling· to give assent, 
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The follo,Ying action was recently taken in the United 
States: 
Resolred b!t thr SenatP and Ilow::e of Repre.'wntatires in thr r·nited State.~ 
of AmPrica in Congre~~ a.-:~emUed, That it i:-- the ~ense of tlw Congress 
of the l·uited State:-: that it i:-: de~irable, in the interest of uniformity 
of action by the maritime State:;: of tlw world in time of war that the 
President endeaYor to bring about an understanding among the priu-
cipalinaritime pO\Yei'S with a view of incorporating into the perma-
nent law of ci\·ilize<l nation~ the> principle of the> exemption of all 
pri,·ate property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or de-
struetion by belligerents. 
Appro,·ed April 28, 190-!. 
The position of the l,. nited States in the exen1ption of 
pri ya te property at t~ea in titne of war is not ha~ecl on the 
con~ideration ad \·anced in certain States. Yiz, that unless 
pri,·ate property i~ exetnpt the State n1ay be cut off frotu 
supplies. The c·nitecl States. population could subsist 
without foreign eonuuerce for a eon~iderable ti1ne "·ith 
little in con ,·en ie nee. 
Attitude (~f ot/,er j)O?cers.-In the war of 186H .. A.ustria, 
Italy~ and Prussia adopted the principle of inununity of 
l)riYate property at sea. The snn1e principle \Yas not 
adopted in the Franco-.Prnt~~ian \ntr of 1870. though Prus-
sia was inclined to urge it on }"'ranee. The aetion of Italy 
in 1866 ''as in accord with the pro,·isions of her Inerchant 
maritin1_e code of 1SG5, ,,hjeh proYided that in tiu1e of 
w·ar ene1ny property on the ~ea~ except contraband, was 
in,?iolable. There haYe also been certain instance~, as in 
the Chinese troubles of 1800~ ·where exetnption:-; ha,·e been 
n1ade on ground::5 of expediency. .A.rtic le XII of the 
treaty between the G nited 8tate~ and Italy of February 
26~ 1871, proYides that-
The l:Iigh Contracting Parties agree that in the unfortunate eYent 
of a ,,·ar between them the pri,·ate prop'erty of their respecti,·e citi-
zens and :3Ubject:3, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be 
exempt from capture or seizure on the high ~eas or elsewhere by the 
armed Yes:-::els or by the military for<.:es of either party, it being under-
stood that thi:;: exemption shall not extewl to Yes~els and their cargoe~ 
which may atten1pt to enter a port blockade1l by the naval force~ of 
either party. (Compilation of Treaties in Force, 1778-190-!, p. -!53.) 
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These are son1e of the main cases in 'vhicb the principle 
of inununity of enemy priv·ate property at sea· in time of 
'var has been adopted in practice or treaty. 
Neither practice or treaty precedent ofl'er sufficient basis 
for regarding the principle as in any sense a recognized one. 
OjJinions on exemjJtion.-The Institute of International 
I.Ja'v in its session of 1877 declared that'" Priyate property, 
'vhether neutral or enen1y, sailing under enetny flag or 
neutral flag, is inviolable.,. 
In a letter of Professor Holland, of Oxford, quoted at 
the Ineeting of the International La·w Association in 1900, 
the follo,ving staten1ent is n1ade: 
The question of inununity see1ns to me to be rather one for politicians 
and shipowners than for lawyers. It is probable that i1nmnnity would 
now be in the interest of Great Britain, but, if so, the continental Gov-
ernments, whateYer n1ay be continental legal opinion, are not likely 
to pledge themselYes to it, and, eyen if they did enter into a general 
convention to that effect could hardly be relied upon to stand by their 
bargain. I doubt the expediency of 1naking treaties about lines of 
conduct which n1ay affect national existence. The strain upon then1 
is likely to be too great for endurance, and one is afraid that one's 
country might be lulled into security by a paper contract which might 
be torn up on the outbreak of hostilities. 
Sir John ~Iacdonell, in writing of England's position in 
1904:, said: 
It appears to 1ne that more and more the interests of England 
become those of a neutral state and that it would be to her advan-
tage on the whole that priYate property on sea were exempt from cap-
ture * * * It is is inconceiyable that the destruction of com-
nlerce at sea of any riYal could detennine in our fayor the issue of a 
war in which we were engaged; while the systematic harrying of our 
trade 1night in certain circumstances be a serious blow to England. 
(Nineteenth Century, NoY., 1904, p. 699.) 
J n another place the san1e writer, treating of private 
property at sea, says: 
For all concerned, but especially for England, which stands to lose 
most, it would probably haYe been well if the offer held out last cen-
tury by Jefferson and Franklin, and repeated by the United States in 
1856 and 1870, to exe1npt such property frmn capture had been adopted. 
(Journal Royal United Service Institution, XLII, pt.~' p. 796.) 
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In Atlay~s recent edition of \Vheaton's International 
Law·, a position opposed to exetnption of capture of pri-
vate property on the high seas is asstnned. The argu-
nlents are stated as follows: 
The indiscriminate seizure of private property on land would cause 
the Inost terrible hardship without conferring any corresponding ad-
vantage on the inYader. It ean not be effected without in some meas-
ure relaxing tnilitary discipline and is sure to be accmnpanied by 
violence and outrage . . On the other hand, the capture of merchant 
vessels is usually a bloodless act, Inost Inerchant vessels being incapa-
ble of resisting a ship of war. Again, property on land consists of 
endless varieties, 1nuch of it being absolutely useless for any hostile pur-
pose, while property at sea is almost always purely merchandise and 
thus is part of the enemy's strength. It is, n1oreover, embarked vol-
untarily and with a knowledge of the risk incurred, and its loss can 
be covered by insurance. An invader on land can levy contributions 
or a war indemnity fro1n a vanquished country; he can occupy part of 
its territory and appropriate its rates and taxes, and by these and 
other methods he can enfeeble the enemy and terminate the war. 
But in a Inaritiine war a belligerent has noi1e of these resources, and 
his tnain in~trutnent of coercion is crippling his enemy's commerce. 
If war at sea were to be restricted to the naval forces, a country pos-
sessing a powerful fleet would have very little ad,·antage over a coun-
try with a small fleet or with none at all. If the enemy kept his 
ships of war in port, a powerful fleet, being unable to operate against 
commerce, would have little or no occupation. The United States pro-
posed to add to the declaration of Paris a clause exempting all private 
property on the high seas from seizure by public armed vessels of the 
other belligerent, except it be contraband, but this proposal was not 
acceded to. Nor does it see1n likely, for the reasons stated above, 
that 1naritime nations will forego their rights in this respect. (Para-
graph 355 b). 
Edtnund Robertson (late civil lord of the Admiralty) 
sutntnarizes the reeent report of the Royal Cotnmission on 
Supply of Food and Ra'v ~laterial in "fime of War, as 
follo,vs: 
( 1) The cmnmission has ascertained the extent of our dependence 
for supplies of foo(l awl raw material on foreign sources. The prime 
fact is that we import four-fifths of the wheat we consume and that 
our stocks 011 hand may run do,vn so lo\v as seven weeks' supply. 
(2) The eornmission was not instructed to deal with exports, but it 
is true, hoth of our exports and our imports, that on the sea, \Vhen 
they are the property of British subjects an<l are carried in British 
ships, they are liable to seizure and confiscation by an enemy in time 
of war. 
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(3) lt is quite clear that this condition of things necessitates what 
iF< called a strong fleet, and that, even with a strong fleet, trade will be 
to some extent endangered, supplies to some extent interrupted, prices 
to smne extent increased. To what extent the commission was didded 
in opinion. 
( 4) The commission accordingJy, or rather various sections of the 
cmnmission, haye suggested various remedies all of which would 
involve serious public expenditure. But the comtnission has not found 
it within its province, as unclerstood by the n1ajority, to deal in any 
way with the rule of international law, which the report declares to 
be the cause of all the apprehended dangers. 
( 5) This rule has been retained in international law mainly by the 
refusal of Great Britain to consent to its abolition at a time when her 
economical and even her naval position in relation to other nations 
was quite unlike what it is now. 
(6) The rule has been gradually falling into discredit-partially in 
this country, generally in n1ost others. 
(7) There is good ground for thinking that the right of capture is of 
no great value to us, and also that it will not, in fact, be exercised to 
any great extent until the closing stages of the war. 
(8) There is also ground for thinking that, apart from the mere ques-
tion of supplies, the rule, taken in connection with the declaration of 
Paris, n1ust have the effect of transferring a large portion of our vast 
carrying trade to neutral flags. 
( 9) At this very moment the rule has been formally challenged once 
more by the United States Government in its proposals for the new 
Hague conference. 
General conclusions as to policy of capture.-Great 
Britain has until recently particularly opposed the prin-
ciple of the exen1ption of private property on th~ sea 
fro1n capture. There now seems to be a tendency on the 
part of the British to recognize that in n1odern warfare 
the capture of private property may be open to question, 
the opinion of sotne of the best of the English authorities 
being that there is little reason for the continuance of the 
practice. 
There is a growing opinion that the reasons for the cap-
ture of the enetuy's pri 'Tate property at sea are economic 
and political rather than n1ilitary. The imn1unity to pri-
vate property should not, ho,veYer, be so extended as to in-
terfere with necessary 1nilitary operations. It would not 
be reasonable to exe1npt private property to such an ex-
tent as to cause the 'var to be of necessity prolonged or to 
result in greater destruction of life.· l1nperati,Te 1nilitary 
168-!3-06--2 
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necessity, of which the superior officer on the field of action 
at the ti1ne must judge, n1ust ov-erride rights of private 
property. The question of damages n1ay be reserved for 
subsequent settle1nent. 
Recent wars have shown the course of trade under influ-
ence of new conditions. 
It has becotne cu~tomary to allow a certain ntunber of 
days of grace during which the vessels of one belligerent 
1nay enter and depart from the port~ of the other belliger-
ent. 'T essels thus sailing are exe1npt frotn capture. 
The ease of rapid com1nunication by telegraph and other-
w'ise renders the know·ledge of the probable outbreak of 
'var general. Few vessels will be taken by surprise or 
'vill start on voyages for ports 'vhich will render then1 
liable t@ capture. 
The practical abandon1nent of prh·ateering 1nakes cap-
ture of pri v·ate property less an object of war. 
The abolition of prize money by soine States re1noves 
one of the stimuli to the capture of private property. 
The development of continental carrying trade has 1nade 
it possible for n1ost States to supply a large portion of 
their needs by oyerland carriage. In the early days of 
capture of property on the sea overland comnterce had not 
received the great itnpetus due to the de,Telopment of 
stean1 and electricity. 
The declaration of Paris of 1856, to the effect that ''the 
neutral flag covers enen1y's goods, 'vith the exception of 
contraband of war," has rnade possible the transfer of a 
large portion of the ene1ny sea cotnmerce to neutral flag 
in time of 'var. The absence of risk under neutral flag 
w·ill also make possible cheaper rates under neutral flags. 
Under ordinary econon1ic laws con1n1erce would thus go 
to neutrals in time of war. 
In recent wars evidence seen1s to show that the capture 
of private property has had little influence on the issue of 
the war and has stirred up en1nity against the captor. 
In the Franco-Pru~sian 'var of 1870 it is reported that not 
more than eighty Gern1an vesse]s were captured. In the 
Spanish-.American 'var, in 1898, co1nparatiYely little inflq. 
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ence was exerted upon the war by the few capture~ of 
private v·essel~ and property, and it \Vonld seem that the 
influence of such capture had been even less in the Russo-
Japanese war of 1904-5 . 
.Niorlern policy seen1s to show that the capture of private 
property at sea does not necessarily bring any great 
ndlitary advantag·e. It tnay happen that the military 
strength may be greatly lessened if na,~al \Tessels are 
sent in pursuit of ye:-;sels hearing priv·ate property. The 
cost of pursuit~ capture~ bring·ing to port, trial, and con-
detnnation n1ay, and often doe::;, exceed the Yalue of the 
goods and vessel captured. 
The British report of the Royal Con1mission on Supply 
of Food and Ra\v ~Taterials in 'fin1e of ''r ar in 1~05 ex-
presses the opinion that '~the first and principal object of 
hoth sides, in case of future n1arititne "Tar~ will be to ob-
tain the comn1and of the sea," and Inaintain::; that eoncen-
tration of the fleet is necessary to accomplish this purpose. 
The equitable practice of days of grace ·will probably 
be continued. The use of itnproved tneans of communi-
cation will be extended. PrivatPering is abandoned. 
Prize money is beginning to be abolished. Land corn-
Inerce is n1ore and tnore deyeloped. In tin1e of war corn-
merce is easily transferred to neutral flags. The actual 
influence of the capture·of private property does not seem 
to be great. Tl1e "reakening of a nav·al force in order to 
pursue and capture private property is of doubtful expe-
diency. Such considerations as these sho\v why the tend-
ency to guarantee the exe1nption of all priYate property 
at sea in tin1e of \var by an international agreement has 
been looked upon with increasing- favor. 
The proposed exemption if it extended to all goods and 
property would probably make necessary an extension of 
the list of contraband. Contraband as no\Y used applies 
only to certain classes of gqods carried by or belong-ing to 
neutrals. If enemy property is placed on the same basis 
as neutral property, the doctrine of contraband must be 
interpreted accordingly and the principles enunciated with 
this in vie'v. 
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Treatn1 ent of special ves~el8.-'fhe Ycssels of the enctny 
used in conunerce tnay be enen1y priYate property. Cer-
tain of the~e Ycssels tnay readily becotne of great service 
to the enetny. V cs~els of like character if belonging to a 
neutral could not be classed as contraband. Owing to the 
ease 'vith 'vhich 1nany types of comtnercial Ycsscl:; n1ay be 
conycrted to "·arlike uses it seerns proper that such agen-
eies of tran~portation should not be placed under the 
general exetnption. 'fhe degree of cxetnption to be 
extended to ,·essels 1nay properly be left to the belliger-
ents to detennine. 
Considering the general conditions of rnodern na-val 
warfare and con1n1ercial relations, as 'veil as the trend of 
opinion~ together with the exceptional character of private 
yessels belonging to enen1y citizen~, an attetupt to fornlu-
late a proper regulation in regard to the exen1ption of 
pri ,·ate property at sea 1nay be con~idered expedient. Of 
course such exen1ption doe~ not coyer property of con· 
traband nature, property involyed in Yiolation of blockade, 
property inYolved in unneutral service, or otherwise con-
cerned directly in the war. The regulation of exetnption 
should apply therefore only to innocent property and 
ships. 
Some such regulation in regard to vessels as the follo,v-
ing seen1s to meet the requiretnents ituposed by the above 
discussion and conclusions: 
Innocent private ships, except belligerent vessels pro-
pelled by machinery and capable of keeping the high sea:;, 
arc not liable to capture. 
· It may be said that the word '~innocent,~ applies only to 
such private property or ships as have no direct relation 
to or share in the hostilities. lt tnay be assutned that 
innocent belligerent goods or ships n1ay be taken in <'ase 
of 1nilitary necessity, and when so taken full retnuneration 
shall be paid, after the analogy of sitnilar action on land. 
R egulatz"on.-lnnocent neutral goods and ships are not 
liable to capture. 
Innocent enemy goods and ships, except vessels propelled 
by n1achinery and capable of keeping the high seas, a!·e not 
liable to capture. 
